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Abstract
Sentences against sovereign States are difficult to enforce in courts. The Court of
New York, in “NML Capital Ltd. vs. Argentina” (NML), tried to solve this situation with
an injunction that blocked the payments of Argentina’s sovereign debt. The special-
ized literature has theoretically predicted that this injunction would cause harm to
third parties and problems with other States. This article empirically corrobo-
rates these predictions with the analysis of a trial derived from NML: the “Citibank
Argentina” case. The analysis of this case confirms the restraints presented by
the literature about the lack of proper consideration of the requirements that the
American legal system imposes for the applicability of an injunction that affects third
parties and operates extraterritorially. Similarly, this paper argues that there are
solid legal reasons for the authorities of third countries to declare inadmissible the
extraterritorial effects of an injunction, such as the one obtained by NML, when
those effects fall on assets and agents located in these authorities jurisdiction.
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Resumo
As sentenças contra Estados soberanos são difíceis de executar judicialmente. O
Tribunal de Nova York, no processo NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina (NML), tentou
modificar esta situação por meio de uma injunction, que bloqueou os pagamentos
da dívida soberana argentina. A literatura especializada previu teoricamente que
esta injunction causaria danos a terceiros inocentes e problemas com outros
Estados. Este artigo corrobora empiricamente essas previsões através da análise
de um processo derivado do NML: o caso Citibank Argentina. Sua análise confir-
ma a validade das reservas oportunamente apresentadas pela literatura sobre a
falta de uma avaliação adequada pelo Tribunal indicado dos requisitos que o sis-
tema jurídico dos Estados Unidos impõe para que seja válida uma injunction que
afeta terceiros e opera extraterritorialmente. O artigo também argumenta que
existem razões jurídicas de peso para que as autoridades de terceiros países
declarem improcedentes os efeitos extraterritoriais de uma injunction, como a
obtida pelo NML, quando esses efeitos recaem sobre ativos e agentes localizados
na jurisdição dessas autoridades.
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Dívida soberana; fundos oportunistas; injunction; imunidade soberana; extrater-
ritorialidade.
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INTRODUCTION
Until the 1980s, sentences against sovereign States were virtually nonexistent. In the United
States (US), in the mid-twentieth century, legal actions of creditors were rejected by the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity from suit. Although this principle became eroded in the following
years, the principle of sovereign immunity from execution did not suffer erosion. At the begin-
ning of the 21st century, in US courts a paradoxical situation emerged: creditors sued Debtor
States, their actions were accepted, they obtained favorable sentences in many cases, but they
did not have effective remedies to enforce them in courts (GELPERN, 2013, p. 132; WEIDE-
MAIER, 2013, p. 123).
The case “NML Capital Ltd. vs. Republic of Argentina” (NML; the press called it the
“trial of the century”)1 modified this statement. Judge Griesa implemented a judicial relief
which a priori appears as the most powerful tool given to a creditor to execute a court judg-
ment against a sovereign State (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013). The core of this relief
was a judicial order (injunction) which prevented agents that were part of the chain of pay-
ments of Argentina’s sovereign debt from actually making these payments, until Argentina
canceled its debt with NML. This order, enforceable since June 2014, meant to leave
Argentina with two options: it either pays NML or defaults on the rest of its debt (WEI-
DEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013).
This judicial relief has been broadly studied in the literature. There are widespread consen-
sus among the authors who analyzed it, over three issues: (a) its novel and radical character;2
(b) the opening to different questions about its scope, operationalization and degree of validi-
ty;3 (c) the possibility it may generate damage to third parties and reactions of other countries
(CROSS, 2015; WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013; ZAMOUR, 2013; RANIERI, 2015; MON-
TELEONE, 2013; SAMPLES, 2014; OLIVARES-CAMINAL, 2011).
This article intends to problematize this latter issue. Weidemaier and Gelpern (2013)
predicted in 2013 that if Argentina refused to pay NML, Judge Griesa would have to increase
its pressure on third parties, which actually happened.4The US government5 in court warned,
See Cross (2015, p. 113). 1
See, for instance, the reactions of many well-known authors to the second circuit’s decision (October 26,2
2012) confirming the district court’s injunction in Zamour (2013, p. 59). 
See, for example, Weidemaier “Into uncharted territory”, “The district court’s decision raises a number3
of difficult questions” (WEIDEMAIER, 2013, p. 127). 
Once the US Supreme Court declined to intervene in NML, since June 16, 2014, Judge Griesa has pro-4
gressively included in the injunction third parties involved in the payment chain of English and Argentine
Law bonds; he also considered whether or not new Argentine bonds (Bonar 24) should be reached by it. 
See US amicus curiae in Cross (2015, p. 139).5
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in 2012 and 2014, that this order would cause reactions from other States, which also actu-
ally happened.6
This is due to the extraterritorial nature of injunction: the referred injunction goes against a
payment system that operates globally. Indeed, it was designed to obstruct not only the pay-
ments that Argentina should make to bondholders through the US territory, but also other
payments that should not pass through this territory. Thus, the injunction ordered actions to
agents who were no part in the trial and whose legal relations were governed by other laws,
because they had not agreed to submit possible litigations to the New York jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, British7, Belgian8 and Argentine9courts, in three different judicial processes,
questioned the reach of the injunction effects in their territories.
This article analyzes the arguments used by the Argentine Judiciary in one of said process-
es – the “Citibank Argentina” case (Citibank A.) – in order to support its judgment.10This
process was chosen over the other two (British and Belgian processes), because it is the only
one which has brought about concrete consequences to date. In fact, in its attempt to avoid
contempt sanctions by the New York Court, which had ordered Citibank A. not to pay some
of the Argentine bondholders, Citibank A. incurred in actions understood by the Argentine
authorities as contrary to its legal system. Therefore, administrative sanctions followed, and a
different agent was appointed as the custody of such bonds.11
The article argues that there are solid legal reasons for the authorities of third countries
to declare an injunction – such as the one obtained by NML – as inadmissible, as it orders
courses of action and causes effects on assets and agents located in their territories. Similarly,
as this paper confirms, with the analysis of a particular empirical case, the validity of the
reservations opportunely stated in the literature – in particular by Weidemaier and Gelpern
(2013) and Cross (2015) – about the lack of proper consideration by the New York Court in
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The reaction of the international community to NML was intense. For instance, NML was the catalyst6
event for the implementation or acceleration of two processes aimed at reforming sovereign debt restruc-
turing frameworks: one in the IMF and the other at the UN (GELPERN, 2016; BOHOSLAVSKY, 2016).
Knighthead Master Fund LP vs. The Bank of New York Mellon (2014), HC-2014-000704, English High Court of7
Justice, Chancery Division, London.
Knighthead Capital Mgmt. LLC et al. vs. The Bank of New York Mellon (2015), 10th Chamber, R.G. 5650/13,8
Sept. 7, Commercial Court of Brussels.
EN-M Economía y FP c/Citibank y otros s/proceso de conocimiento, Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Fede-9
ral Nº 12, fallo 15.400/2015, Buenos Aires. 
Ibid.10
See order Nº 17.634, March 27, 2015, of Argentina’s National Securities Commission, and order Nº 102,11
April 1, 2015, of Argentina’s Central Bank. 
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NML of the admissibility requirements imposed by the American legal system for an injunc-
tion that affects third parties and operates extraterritorially. 
Finally, this article goes back on the analyzed ideas and considers the structural limits of
local jurisdictions to solve problems beyond their scale. When a court of a particular country
intervenes in a sovereign debt dispute, it is inherently limited by its jurisdictional scope and
its position as a State at the time of judging another equally sovereign State. It is understood
that the awareness of these limits, which are also strengths in the current international gov-
ernance, is essential to avoid the temptation of constructing legal shortcuts – in terms of Sam-
ples (2014) – which could put its own credibility at risk by denaturalizing institutes created
for other purposes.
Accordingly, the article is divided into three sections. Firstly, it shows the particular char-
acteristics that an injunction acquires when applied to a sovereign State, taking into particular
consideration the issues related to third parties and extraterritoriality. Secondly, it traces the
origin of the Citibank A. case as derived from NML, outlining its role in the payment of
Argentina’s sovereign debt and presenting the main events of the conflict. Finally, it analyzes
how the Argentine Court interpreted, in the Citibank A. case, the validity of an order issued
by a foreign judge with the intention of affecting assets and agents located in its territory while
stressing the conflict of jurisdictions.
1 CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT INJUNCTIONS APPLIED AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES:
THIRD PARTIES AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The degree of protection of sovereign property is wide in the US. Most of the assets that States
have in the US territory are reached by the principle of sovereign immunity and, therefore,
remain outside the range of a possible embargo or similar related to a sentence condemning
them to make payments to their creditors. The effectiveness of traditional reliefs (monetary
remedies) that creditors have to legally enforce this kind of judgments has, consequently,
proven to be limited (GELPERN, 2013).
In ordinary judicial processes, these reliefs are not the only remedies that the law offers
plaintiffs in their attempt to enforce judgments. Courts could order private defendants to per-
form a particular course of action with the aim of remedying or preventing damage derived
from their actions (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013). Injunction, in the terms of Section 65
of the US Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP), is a judicial remedy that does not directly
apply to objects but to subjects (RANIERI, 2015).
Injunctions, Weidemaier and Gelpern (2013) explain, are equitable remedies, to be grant-
ed only when the plaintiff has no adequate judicial remedy and only when the remedy is,
broadly speaking, consistent with the equitable exercise execution of the court’s power:
“Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practical-
ity have made equity the instrument for nice reconciliation between the public interest
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and private needs as well as between competing private claims (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN,
2013, p. 13)”.
Could a judge of New York, in a patrimonial litigation, impose an injunction against a State?
This question is debated in the literature. Generally speaking, the existing opinions can be polar-
ized into two positions. Those who are against this possibility argue that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 is organized following a broad conception of the principle of sov-
ereign immunity, having exhaustively listed its exceptions. Then, the silence surrounding regu-
lation must be interpreted restrictively. The FSIA does not expressly admit injunction as a judicial
relief aimed to enforce monetary judgments against States and, consequently, it should not be
admitted in court decisions (CROSS, 2015; ARAYA; TUCULET, 2014; MONTELEONE,
2013). The opposite position considers that injunction is appropriate since the FSIA equates
States to private agents to such effects. They base their position on Section 1606 which declares
that “‘[a]s to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign State is not entitled to immu-
nity,” under the Act, “the foreign State shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances (WEIDEMAIER, 2013, p. 135)’.”
Even those who join the latter position understand that, if the defendant is a State, judges
must quite considerably assess the possible implications of injunction in light of the principles
of comity and reciprocity; in particular, when injunction is extended to third parties (WEIDE-
MAIER; GELPERN, 2013).
1.1 INJUNCTIONS AND THIRD PARTIES
There is nothing in the nature of monetary remedies that a priori makes them more effective
than injunctions to enforce a sentence. In fact, the opposite may be the case: injunctions would
have greater enforceability than monetary remedies depending on the particular characteristics
of a concrete case.
Much of the enforcement power of an injunction obeys the fact that it may be extended to
agents who are not directly involved in the dispute. This is so according to Section 65 (d) (2)
of the US FRCP, which specifically declares that the judicial order could be extended to those
agents who act “in active concert or participation with” the defendant. It can be seen that the
legislation gives judges a broad discretional power, so that they may have the flexibility to adapt
their decisions to particular circumstances. The breadth of their discretional power justifies the
demand of a rigorous analysis of its admissibility requirements: an injunction is a measure of
ultima ratio, to be applied only when there is no other available legal remedy and when the
plaintiff is at risk of suffering irreparable damage if injunction is not actually applied (ARAYA;
TUCULET, 2014).
The coercion of this relief lies in the menace of contempt sanctions. As Weidemaier and
Gelpern (2013) explain, this kind of coercion introduces two differences between injunctions
and monetary remedies, which must be taken into account at the moment of analyzing the
Citibank A. case.
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In the first place, the honor of the court is not directly involved in monetary remedies.
If the plaintiff fails to gather assets enough to obtain credit, the problem lies principally
with the plaintiff and not with the court. In an injunction, the court itself is involved in the
dispute; or, differently stated, the court’s reputation gets involved in the conflict. A chal-
lenge by the defendant or by third parties reached by its order is considered a challenge to
its own authority and, thus, it should be punished due to contempt to the court. Conse-
quently, the nature of the assets at stake is modified: in a monetary conflict, the monetary
remedies relate assets of economic nature to assets of economic nature, while in an injunc-
tion such assets are put in relation to the honor of the Court (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN,
2013). Then, it follows that there are good reasons to assume that, if the defendant of a par-
ticular case remains defiant, the judge will widen the scope of the injunction until the order
is effectively complied with. 
Secondly, both monetary remedies and injunctions affect third parties; with the former,
there may be side effects, while with the latter third parties could be significantly affected.
Such is the case when the defendant is a sovereign State. The principle of sovereign equality
prevents a State from being declared in contempt or if it actually were (as indeed happened
in the case of Argentina), the declaration does not affect it the same way it would affect pri-
vate agents. Therefore, courts cannot enforce injunctions in their traditional way. In such
cases, the threat of harm to third parties goes from the periphery to the center of the judi-
cial relief, becoming virtually the only mechanism of legal coercion. The possibility of sanc-
tioning third parties loses its incidental character and becomes a deliberate gamble for
ensuring the court’s authority: following Weidemaier and Gelpern, “if an injunction is a
judicial gamble in which the court stakes its credibility on compliance, the NML injunction
[that is, an injunction against a State] is a gamble with other people’s money (WEIDEMAIER;
GELPERN, 2013, p. 7)”.
However, for an injunction to be valid, it should avoid damage to third parties as much
as possible. The conciliation of a legal remedy, whatever it may be, with the public interest
consists primarily in assessing to what extent this remedy benefits or harms third parties.
The court, at the moment of ordering an injunction, should quite especially explain the gain
for the community that could justify possible harm to agents who are outside the main
object of the dispute (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013). In the particular case of sover-
eign debt litigations, this general principle acquires specificity to the extent that the inter-
mediary agents that are part of an international payment system are a priori covered by
Article 4 of the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and by Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank
Act (DFA),which describe said activities as systemically relevant (CROSS, 2015).
An injunction against a challenging State (probably “all” States to whom it is applied, con-
sidering that an injunction appears only when other legal remedies have failed) may push a
judge of a given litigation into a dilemma by having to choose between two contradictory
courses of action: on the one hand, increasing the extent of an injunction over to third parties
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with the purpose of pressuring the defendant to serve the order; on the other hand, pre-
venting the cost of the measure to innocent third parties from going beyond the expected
benefits. This consideration acquires a new dimension if the relief exceeds the limits of the
court jurisdiction.
1.2 INJUNCTIONS, THIRD PARTIES AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The sovereign debt market has been globalized. Since the 1970s, this market has suffered a
rapid transformation in two interrelated aspects: the nature of the creditors and the type of
debt. With respect to the first aspect, this market, from being in the 80’s, a relatively small and
homogeneous universe of creditors, became particularly large and heterogeneous at the begin-
ning of the 21st century. For example, after the debt crisis of 1982, the Mexican government
had to negotiate with little over 500 commercial banks with headquarters in G7 countries –
(BOUGHTON, 2001) – while, after the crisis of 2001, the Argentine government had to do it
with hundreds of thousands of bondholders spread all around the world (RANIERI, 2015,
p. 266). In relation to the second aspect, it should be noted that in the 80’s, States borrowed
debt mainly through direct and syndicated agreements with commercial banks, while in the
early 21st century they did so mostly through the issuance of securities, which are fungible and
freely transferable in capital and complementary markets, and which resulted in the emergence
of a global network of specialized financial agents that assist States in custody and payment of
such securities (RANIERI, 2015).
There are basically two legal forms in which a State can be related to those agents: by
means of a “fiscal agent agreement” or a “trust indenture”. The main difference between these
two forms, as Olivares-Caminal (2011) observes, is that, in the first case, the fiscal agent acts
as a representative of the sovereign issuer, while in the second the trustee is a representative
agent of bondholders. This distinction is not a minor issue: as soon as the funds are deposited
in the trustee’s account, they are not the sovereign’s funds anymore (they are held by the
trustee acting on behalf of the bondholders), since the funds held in a fiscal agent’s account
belong to the sovereign until they are deposited to each creditor’s accounts. In this process,
the place of payment is relevant: in fact, if the trustee’s account is within the territory of the
issuer State, the State completes the transfer of property of the fund entirely within its own
jurisdiction, which a priori contributes to protect these funds against possible embargoes or
similar dictated by foreign judges (OLIVARES-CAMINAL, 2011, p. 42).
The rights and obligations of the fiscal agent or trustee are stated in the fiscal agent agree-
ment or trust indenture. However, their actions are also regulated by the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which they are licensed. For example, Euroclear Bank, a financial institution that helps
Argentina with the payment of its European bondholders, is subject to Belgian Law as a finan-
cial institution authorized by the competent authority of said country (National Bank of Bel-
gium and Financial Services and Markets Authority) to operate in its market. If the fiscal agent
or trustee is a branch of an international financial institution with headquarters located in the
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territory of another State, for legal purposes it is considered as a separate entity of this insti-
tution (Separate Entity Doctrine and Rule).12
The fiscal agreement or trust indenture not only rules the relationship between the State
and the fiscal agent or trustee but also that relationship generated between them and the hold-
ers of debt securities (bondholders). It is common that these contracts foresee, in case of con-
flict, that the parties submit the dispute to the Law and jurisdiction of a particular State. In
effect, there are Argentine bonds governed by, for example, England, Argentina and the State
of New York legislation, as was the case of the bonds held by the NML fund.13
Can a judge of New York set an injunction which prescribes a course of action to a payment
system agent located outside the territory of its jurisdiction, with the aim of forcing a sover-
eign State to comply with its judgment?
Those who answer affirmatively justify their position in the transfer of jurisdiction that the
Debtor State has made in favor of this Court. Their arguments are quite simple. The injunction
falls on the State; extending it to third parties is a consequence of its resistance to comply with
an order of a court to which the State has voluntarily submitted, authorized by Section 65 (d)
(2) of the US FRCP. The principle of comity does not apply to this case precisely because of
the State’s attitude, which is contrary to American Law, expressed by the Court in its resolu-
tions. The threat of damaging third parties, including those located outside the US territory,
arises from the need to ensure compliance with the court’s orders, taking into account the cir-
cumstances of a concrete case.14
The arguments of the opposite position are more solid. The presumption against extrater-
ritoriality is an interpretative principle of US Law that has been in practice for two centuries.
The stated purpose behind this presumption, as observed by Cross (2015), is to protect against
unintended clashes between US laws and those of other nations. US courts traditionally are
careful when issuing injunctions against sovereigns and have invoked this presumption as the
basis for limiting extension of the courts to the US territory.
Moreover, the US Supreme Court has applied this presumption against extraterritoriality
over the past two decades, starting in 1991 with its adoption in the Aramco case, in different
opportunities (CROSS, 2015). Cross also gathers the reasons given by the US Supreme Court
in favor of the respect for this presumption around four axes. First, customary international
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See Cross (2015) and NML: Memorandum of law in support of Citibank, N.A.’s renewed motion by order12
to show cause for clarification, June 19, 2014. 
See FAA 1994, <shearman.com/en/services/key-issues/argentine-sovereign-debt?section=related-13
source-materials>, visited January 10, 2017. 
These arguments are a synthesis of those presented by Judge Griesa and the US Court of Appeal in NML.14
See, Weidemaier and Gelpern (2013). 
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law sets limits to a State’s authority to apply its Law to activity occurring outside its borders.
An act of Congress should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law.
Second, the presumption is grounded in consideration of international comity. Third, the pre-
sumption follows the separation of powers concerns –specifically, concerns related to the
determination of whether US legislation should be applied abroad and how it could be done,
which raises difficult and sensitive policy considerations falling outside both the institutional
competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary. Fourth, the presumption pro-
tects US interests in the long term because it discourages other countries from imposing their
laws extraterritorially on US agents (CROSS, 2015). 
The rationale for limiting court decisions to its jurisdictional territory makes sense when
the issue is visualized from the point of view of the foreign agents reached by its orders.
From the standpoint of a payment system agent that operates, for instance, in Europe, the
legitimacy of the order of a court, whose jurisdiction said agent has not been contractually tied
to, is very difficult to justify; it becomes more difficult when compliance with it can cause con-
flicts with the agent’s customers or the competent authority in the territory where the agent
is licensed.
From the standpoint of a Japanese bondholder, for example, the argumentation is even
clearer. He could rightly ask: which is the legitimacy of a New York judge to set an order to
retain money directed to pay me and based on a trial I am no part of, under a legal system I
do not belong in, and with the aim of paying another creditor? Who will pay for the damage
I may support if the Debtor State deposited said funds to the corresponding payment agents,
and a judicial order prevents these funds from effectively being deposited to my account?
Finally, from the position of the authorities of another State, this issue also makes sense:
Why the Italian government, for example, should accept that a New York judge set an order
with the intention of producing effects on the payment system agents located in Italian terri-
tory and harming its citizens (Italian bondholders)? This article is focused on this point of
view. The Citibank A. case shows the clash of jurisdictions that follows the implementation of
the injunction ordered by Judge Griesa and the authorities of the Argentine government. This
case is also significant if it is noted that the Argentine government, in fact, had transferred the
jurisdiction of the bonds held by NML to the Court of New York following the Fiscal Agent
Agreement (FAA) of 1994. Is this transfer of jurisdiction sufficient for a New York judge to
prescribe actions with the intention of being implemented in Argentine territory?
2 THE CITIBANK A. AS A CASE DERIVED FROM NML: PRINCIPAL EVENTS
To understand the judicial process substantiated in Argentina, firstly, it is necessary to explain
the role that the Citibank A. played in relation to certain bonds issued by Argentina and, sec-
ondly, to sum up its participation in the NML case.
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2.1 CITIBANK A. AND ITS ROLE IN THE PAYMENT CHAIN OF ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT
Citibank A. is a branch of Citibank N.A., located in Buenos Aires and licensed by the Central
Bank (“BCRA”) and the National Securities Commission (“CNV”), both of Argentina, to conduct
banking business in this country.15
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt. In 2005 and 2010, Argentina offered
holders of its defaulted debt the option to exchange their bonds for new bonds (the “Exchange
Bonds”). The restructuring process closed with almost 93% adherence of the total universe of
bondholders in it (KUPELIAN; RIVAS, 2014).
NML, a vulture fund,16 is part of the remaining 7% (holdouts). NML holds Argentine
bonds regulated by the FAA of 1994. Concerning these bonds, NML triggered numerous
lawsuits against Argentina in New York, obtaining favorable judgments in several of them.
Despite its many attempts, NML could not execute these judgments because the assets they
meant to embargo were considered as included in the principle of sovereign immunity. In
2010, NML changed its strategy and brought the case against Argentina, requesting a state-
ment of violation of the pari passu clause and the implementation of measures directed to
ensure that Argentina effectively comply with court orders (“specific performance”) (ARAYA;
TUCULET, 2014).
Citibank A. is not a fiscal agent of Argentina. Citibank is a trustee acting as local cus-
todian for certain holders of the Exchange Bonds issued in 2005 and 2010: those who
hold Peso and US Dollar-denominated bonds governed by Argentine Law (the “Argentine
Law Bonds”).17
The relationship between Argentina, Citibank A. and these said bondholders was
defined in a trust indenture. This indenture was annexed to the two decrees (N° 1735/04
and 563/10) by means of which the Argentine government ordered the issuance of all
Exchange Bonds, including the Argentine Law Bonds.18
Sections 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5 of Article 3 of the trust indenture and the conditions of the
Argentine Law Bonds define the payment procedure. Initially, Argentina transfers funds to
the account of “Central de Registro y Liquidación de Instrumentos de Endeudamiento Público” (“CRYL”)
in the Central Bank (BCRA). Then, CRYL transfers an equal sum to Caja de Valores S.A. (“Caja”).
Caja, the next step, forwards the payments to Citibank A. Finally, Citibank A. transfers the
payments to its customers, including the clearing houses Euroclear and Clearstream, which
distribute their portion of the interest payments to bondholders. Citibank A.’s obligation to
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its Custody Account Customers is completed when the cash accounts of those customers have
been credited.19
Consequently, in this process, the transfer of property of these funds by Argentina is con-
ducted entirely in Argentina’s territory, without connection to the US territory at all. The
terms of the trust indenture are clear in this regard. The funds held by Citibank A. are funds
that the entity retains on behalf of its customers. Once received by the trustee, the funds are
held by those trusts and Argentina has no interest in them.20
Finally, it should be noted that Citibank A., in its role as trustee of Argentine Law Bonds,
is not submitted to the Law or to the jurisdiction of the State of New York, because Citibank
A., to all legal purposes, constitutes a separate entity of Citibank N.A, with headquarters in
New York.21 Also, because bonds in its custody are ruled by the laws and the jurisdiction of
Argentina, laws to which Citibank A. is also submitted as an entity licensed to operate in the
financial and capital markets of Argentina.22
2.2 CITIBANK A. IN THE NML LITIGATION: PAYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
The first relevant intervention23 of Citibank A. in the NML case took place June 19, 2014.24
The day before, it was warned, in a hearing, that if Argentina did not comply with Judge
Griesa’s order of February 23, 2012, (injunction) Argentina would default on its debt June 30,
2014.25The Citibank A. intervention, therefore, sought to clarify whether the Argentine Law
Bonds were or not reached by this order.26
The injunction became enforceable on June 16, 2014, when the US Supreme Court
declined to intervene in the NML case.27 Its contents had been defined by Judge Griesa on
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NML: Decision of the US Supreme Court, June 16, 2014, Certiorari, No. 12–842. 27
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November 21, 2012, at the request of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.28 On that
occasion, Judge Griesa basically stated that Argentina had to pay principal and interests to
NML, before paying off the rest of its exchange bondholders. Anticipating a possible noncom-
pliance of Argentina, the Judge ordered the payment system agents to refrain from collabo-
rating in the sovereign debt payments under penalty of contempt.29This addendum was also
confirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 23, 2013.30
None of the documents mentioned Citibank A., so the entity assumed it was not reached
by the injunction.31This assumption was confirmed by Judge Griesa. On June 27, 2014, the
Judge authorized Citibank A. the June 30 payment of Argentine Law Bonds.32 Days later, he
extended this authorization to Euroclear and Clearstream.33
Argentina understood the injunction as an order of impossible compliance – (KUPELIAN;
RIVAS, 2014) – and paid the bonds that were due on June 30. While the payment of Exchange
Bonds governed by New York and English Law was, because of the injunction, retained in the
Bank of New York (BNY), account of Buenos Aires, the payments related to Argentine Law
Bonds followed their course without difficulty and reached the bondholders’ accounts.34
Observing this scenario, on July 11, 2014 plaintiffs presented a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the order that authorized the payment of Argentine Law Bonds (order of June 27). In
general terms, they argued that Judge Griesa should differentiate between Argentine Law
Bonds in dollars and in pesos. The former, they noted, are not domestic but external debt and,
therefore, should be reached by the injunction.35
The Judge accepted the reconsideration. From this moment until its final resolution
(March 12, 2015), a transition period started in which the Judge authorized Citibank A. three
times “just for one-time” to make the payments of July 30, September 30 and December 31,
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2014, respectively.36Among the reasons the Judge wielded to justify his decision, he stressed
his desire of not affecting, with the injunction, the settlement recently signed by Argentina
and Repsol.37
Although the orders authorized the payments, it was clear that Argentine Law Bonds
denominated in dollars were actually reached by the injunction. Consequently, Citibank A.
appealed the first order (July 28 order). The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on jurisdic-
tional grounds, but noted that “nothing in this Court’s order is intended to preclude Citibank
from seeking further relief from the District Court.”38 Thus, on September 22, 2014,
Citibank A. filed a new motion against the July 28 order. Judge Griesa accepted to consider
this motion and established a new schedule for the parties to present their arguments.39
They did so mid-February 2015. Plaintiffs presented documents with the aim of proving
that the Argentine Law Bonds denominated in dollars were not offered exclusively in Argentina
but in other jurisdictions; thus – they argued – these Bonds should be considered as external
debt.40 Citibank A. opposed this consideration and reiterated its reasons about the absence of
a jurisdiction of the New York Court and the unnecessary harm that the extension of the injunc-
tion would cause.41
March 12, 2015, Judge Griesa ruled against the motion of Citibank A., arguing that those
Bonds were in their vast majority “external debt” and that Citibank A. was a “participant” under
the terms of its injunction. Similarly, the Judge rejected the defense arguments about the
absence of jurisdiction observing that “Citibank’s global headquarters are located in New York.
Citibank N. A. merely maintains a branch in Argentina. Moreover […] this Court’s injunction
is not directed at Citibank but at a defendant, The Republic of Argentina.”42
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2.3 TRIGGERING OFF THE CITIBANK A. CASE: THE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 20, 2015 
The order of March 12, 2015 left Citibank A. in a difficult position. Some days before,
the head office of the entity had informed Judge Griesa that “Argentina has a legitimate
interest in applying its banking laws”43 and “if Citibank A. does not remit to its customers
the funds it receives, as will all other custodians, it will be in violation of Argentine
banking law. The Republic could revoke Citibank A.’s license and even impose criminal
liability on its employees.”44This way, Citibank A. was caught between two irreconcilable
obligations: violating the injunction would expose it to sanctions in New York; obeying it
would do so in Argentina.
For this reason, the very March 12, Citibank A. requested Judge Griesa a stay to delay the
implementation of the injunction, allowing it to order the payment due March 31. The risk of
sanctions in Argentina, the bank observed, is not hypothetical: “Officials of The Republic with
authority over Citibank A. have “demand[ed] that [Citibank A.] continue acting to further and
to protect the interests of the holders of the Argentine [Law] Bonds””.45
On March 16, the Judge denied the requested stay.46 Simultaneously, Argentine authorities
ordered Citibank A. to inform, in a 48 hour period, which would be the position of the bank
concerning the distribution of the referred payments.47The next day, the entity informed the
Judge about its intention to renounce as custodian of Argentine Law Bonds, the reason why the
bank renewed its stay request.48
The process took an unexpected twist. On March 20, Citibank A. presented to the Judge
an agreement reached with the plaintiffs. The Judge accepted it and homologated it. In prac-
tice, this meant that the Judge granted the requested stay in exchange for a series of obligations
which the entity was committed to.49Among the arguments given by the Judge, he stressed his
desire not to sanction Citibank A., “a major international branch of Citibank with thousands of
employees and banking operations in Argentina.”50 The authorities of Argentina denounced a
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shift in the Judge’s line of argumentation and his partial attitude for leaving key issues in the
hands of plaintiffs of the operationalization of his injunction.51
The agreement was basically about the resignation of Citibank A. to the role of custodian;
it stipulated deadlines and procedures to make the resignation effective. Similarly, according to
the agreement the entity agreed to waive any and all rights to: (a) appealing the Court’s orders
related to Argentine Law Bonds; (b) seeking a stay without the consent of plaintiffs of any of
these orders or of the injunction itself.52
Immediately, Argentine authorities activated an investigation in relation to Citibank A. per-
formance and concluded, firstly, that bondholders ran serious risk of not collecting their pay-
ments due to March 31 and, secondly, that the entity had violated the national legislation.
Therefore, the CNV decided, by Resolution N° 17.634 of March 27, 2015, to preventively stop
Citibank A. from operating on capital markets, and replace it as custodian of the Argentine Law
Bonds of Caja de Valores. Also, the BCRA, by Resolution N° 102 of April 1, 2015, revoked the
authorization granted to Ribisich to serve as director of Citibank A. Ribisich filed legal action
requesting to be taken back, which was denied by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo N° 3 of
Buenos Aires.53
In addition, the Argentine government informed Judge Griesa, on April 6, 2015, that it
would appeal his March 12 Order before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,54 some-
thing which actually happened on August 11.55
Finally, Argentina’s Ministry of Economics (MECON) asked Argentina’s National Court to
declare the ordered agreement unconstitutional and, thereby, to annul its effects. For this pur-
pose, MECON argued that the agreement: (1) was signed with neither the participation of
Argentina nor the affected bondholders; (2) prevents payments from effectively reaching a cer-
tain percentage of its bondholders, because it only authorizes Citibank A., and not the rest of
the involved agents in the payment chain, to transfer them; (3) precludes a future custodian
agent from paying its bondholders since the referred authorization is exclusively granted to
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Citibank A.; (4) goes against bondholders’ interests because it provides a waiver to the right to
appeal judicial decisions which harm or could harm them.56
MECON completed its legal action by demanding a cautionary measure. The objective of
this measure was the immediate suspension of the effects and implementation actions of the
agreement until the principal object of the action was resolved.57 About this demand, the
Argentine Federal Court N° 4 in charge of Judge Marra Giménez – as can be seen below –
pronounced judgment in the referred Citibank A. case.58
3 EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF FOREIGN JUDGES’ ORDERS IN ARGENTINA’S
JURISPRUDENCE: THE CITIBANK A. CASE
In Argentina, as is also common in other jurisdictions, the admissibility of a cautionary measure
as the requested one depends on two requirements (Art. 230 of the Argentinean Proceedings
Code; CPCCN.): the risk of irreparable harm because of the delay (periculum in mora) and the
credibility of the alleged right (fumus bonis iuris). In this case, the intervening Court held that
both requirements had effectively been set.59
The first requirement was set since the agreement had already been implemented, since
the time when Citibank A. had advised Euroclear and Clearstream about its desire to leave the
custodian business. The periculum in mora, the Judge considered, existed because the delay could
cause irreparable harm: (a) to the National State, to the extent that the agreement could inter-
fere in its essential right to pay its sovereign debt; and, (b) to the bondholders who could not
collect their credits.60
The second requirement was set since the involved bonds are governed by Argentine Law
(Decrees N° 1735/04 and 563/2010); then, the Judge concluded the agreement violates a
number of rights protected by the Argentine legal system.61
Initially, the agreement violates the national jurisdiction to which are subjected the
parties involved in these Bonds. This is so, the Judge considered, because Citibank A. homolo-
gated the agreement in a foreign court. The Argentine Law Bonds did not prescribe a transfer
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of jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court. Hence, the conclusion was, in the Citibank A.
case, that there occurred an illegal transfer of Argentina’s jurisdiction to the benefit of a
foreign court.62
The agreement, the Judge noted, constitutes a US “judgment”, in terms of Rule N° 54
(a) of the US FRCP. In effect, an agreement, initially signed only between private agents
(NML and Citibank A.), became a judgment according to US Law since it was ordered by
Judge Griesa.63
However, a foreign judgment cannot produce direct effects on Argentine territory; to do
so (or more technically, to become an executable title in the country), it must follow a pro-
cedure called exequatur (Art. 517 CPCCN). Argentina’s Supreme Court (CSJN), in the Claren
Corporation case of 2014,64 stated that the exequatur is not just a bureaucratic procedure but
a real procedure of constitutional review. During this procedure, judges must evaluate, among
other issues, whether the foreign order was pronounced by a competent judge, whether there
was a fair trial and that it did not affect the public order of Argentine Legislation (Art. 517
CPCCN). This type of control, the CSJN stated, is not a peculiarity of the Argentine legal sys-
tem; on the contrary, it is recognized in an overwhelming number of international conven-
tions and domestic legislations.65
It is worth mentioning that the named Claren Corporation case is a direct judicial prece-
dent of the Citibank A. case. This is so because this case showed the attempt of this corpo-
ration to turn in its favor, via exequatur, another of Judge Griesa’s judgments on an exe-
cutable title in Argentina. As in NML, the fiscal agent agreement (FAA-1994) of the bonds
held by Claren Corporation explicitly prescribed an extension of Argentine jurisdiction in
favor of the Court of New York. The extension, the CSJN stated, does not prevent the pos-
sibility of an a posteriori constitutional review of the foreign judgment by an Argentine
Court; if said extension is not understood as a relationship between two legal systems, then
it may be said to be like a shot in the dark. Its acceptance does not mean giving up those
aspects of the sovereign immunity principle that protect iure imperii acts, the acts which dis-
tinguish sovereign States from colonial regimes. In particular, this kind of extension does
not prevent the recognition that the enforceability of a foreign judgment depends on the
respect for the domestic public order – Art. 517 (4) CPCCN.66
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In the Citibank A. case, the Judge concluded that Citibank A. violated the national juris-
diction since the entity did not even activate the referred exequatur to enforce the agreement
ordered by Judge Griesa in Argentina.67
Judge Marra Giménez observed that the agreement, by obstructing the restructuring
of the Argentine sovereign debt, violates norms of national public order.68To properly under-
stand this statement it is necessary to refer again to the Claren Corporation case. In this
case, the CSJN observed that the Bonds held by the plaintiff, originally regulated by the
FAA of 1994, were subject – like other similar public securities – to the norms dictated
by the State during the crisis of 2001. These norms declared a default because of the
extreme emergency situation, and instructed the national government to conduct a sov-
ereign debt restructuring (Acts N° 25.561 and 25.565). In the light of this instruction,
the government conducted two processes, supported by the National Congress (Acts N°
26.017 and Nº 26.547), which obtained the adherence of more than 90% of its creditors.
In this context, the CSJN stated that admitting the claim of Claren Corporation “would
imply to validate that the plaintiff, by way of an individual action conducted on a foreign
court, circumvents the restructuring realized by the Argentine government in correspon-
dence with the emergency norms issued by competent authorities in accordance with the
National Constitution”.69
In a previous procedure, the Galli case of 2005,70 creditors of the Argentine State had
precisely questioned the constitutionality of these norms. The CSJN, in this case and taking
into account the precedent “Bruniccardi”,71 considered constitutional the faculties of the
State with respect to its power to suspend payments of its sovereign debt and to restructure
it in contexts of extreme economic crisis. Those powers, the CSJN stated, constitute a
State’s essential powers relative to its sovereign nature, and the norms by which such pow-
ers are exercised are part – of the public order in the Argentine legislation – such as the
Judge in the Citibank A. case concluded. Both issues (the State powers to restructure its
debt in times of extreme crisis and the iure imperii character of the acts through which those
powers are actualized), the CSJN stated, are principles of the Law of Nations.72
Finally, Judge Marra Giménez decided that Citibank A. had violated the Argentine Law
because it did not follow the regulatory regime that establishes the legal procedure for
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abandoning the role of custodian of Argentine bonds,73 violation for which Citibank A. was
sanctioned by the CNV and the BCRA.74
In the light of these arguments, the Judge decided to grant the cautionary measure request-
ed by MECON and, therefore, ordered Citibank A. to abstain from any action to implement the
referred agreement.75
CONCLUSIONS
There is nothing such as a bankruptcy international court or similar. Consequently, the inter-
national community has found in key financial jurisdictions a pragmatic solution to have judges
who can intervene in the settlement of conflicts in which a State and its creditors cannot reach
a harmonious resolution to a dispute related to sovereign debt.
However, the intervention of these jurisdictions is inherently limited given, on the one
hand, the national character with respect to a global dispute and, on the other hand, the State
nature at the time of judging another State equally sovereign. The Court of New York in the
NML case aimed to circumvent these structural limits by setting up an ad hoc solution.
Since the beginning, the literature has shown reservations whether the US Law require-
ments to order an injunction were actually set in this case (WEIDEMAIER, 2013; CROSS,
2015; WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013; SAMPLES; 2014; MONTELEONE; 2013;
ZAMOUR; 2013). Of all these reservations, this article has focused on two interrelated issues:
“third party damage” and “extraterritoriality”.
Damage to third parties, as a general principle for setting an injunction, cannot exceed the
expected benefits. This requirement was not set in NML, or, at least, the judges have not to
date adequately explained the existing balance between these two extremes.76They didn’t sat-
isfactorily explained why the payment system agents reached by the injunction were not cov-
ered by Title VIII of the DFA and Art. 4 of the UCC: “neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals made any effort to explain why the interest in obtaining relief for NML trumped
foreign government policies designed to protect financial intermediaries. To the contrary, the
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Court of Appeals dodged such questions on procedural grounds (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN,
2013, p. 34)”.
The analysis empirically confirms the reservations theoretically stated by Weidemaier
and Gelpern in 2013: an injunction against a State tends to become extensive over to third
parties when the State remains in a defiance attitude (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013).
Nine months passed between the moment when the injunction became enforceable (June
16, 2014) and the moment when the Judge defined the Argentine Law Bonds situation
(March 12, 2015). In this period, Argentina refused to pay NML and was declared in con-
tempt without concrete effects. There are good reasons for assuming that the actual ideas
which justified the March 12 Order are related to the Judge’s attempt at increasing pres-
sure on Argentina. 
Similarly, the analyzed case shows that the damage to third parties was not hypothetical but
concrete. There are, in this sense, two types of third parties affected by the injunction in NML.
Firstly, there are the payment system agents. As mentioned above, the injunction placed
Citibank A. in a tight position: the entity should evaluate its course of action, knowing that
one way or another the Law would be violated, depending on which would be the best pos-
sible option. Citibank A. chose to leave its custody of the Argentine Law Bonds (something
which is a damage itself) to avoid contempt sanctions in New York. The way it did so (fol-
lowing the agreement of March 20, 2015) effectively violated the Argentine legislation and
implied penalties.
In this case, the injunction should be inadmissible for requiring an agent to violate the Law
of the jurisdiction in which it is licensed. Recently, the principles that protect bank branches
have been strongly reaffirmed by New York courts.77The position of Citibank A. was not an
isolated case in NML. The rest of the intermediary agents reached by the injunction are subject
to possible sanctions in the foreign jurisdictions where they operate, something which was
repeatedly informed to the Judge.78
Secondly, there are the remaining bondholders, those who were not paid because the
injunction prevented the transfer to their accounts of the funds deposited by Argentina. The
words of Weidemaier and Gelpern again make sense: “If an injunction is a judicial gamble in
which the court stakes its credibility on compliance, the NML injunction is a gamble with
other people’s money” (WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013, p. 7). The analyzed case helped
to see that the global character of the injunction affected thousands of bondholders all around
the world.
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See Citibank’s motion for clarification, above 12.77
In this sense, the Euroclear case is significant since the Belgian Law was enacted precisely to protect clear-78
inghouses from injunctions of this sort. See Olivares-Caminal (2011, p. 53). 
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For the injunction to be admissible – it must be repeated – the Judge should explain why
the benefits of paying NML were greater than the costs suffered by third parties as a result
of implementing the injunction, something which has not occurred yet. The question remains
open about how and whom the affected bondholders could claim for damage compensation,
considering that the Court of Appeal of New York79 and the Court of England80 confirmed
that the funds frozen by the injunction (in some cases since June, 2014, to April, 2016) no
longer belong to Argentina.
The extraterritoriality of the injunction existed, as was reflected in the studied case, as from
the moment of the ordered courses of action to agents (among others, Citibank A. and Euro-
clear) located outside the US territory, and produced effects on assets (the funds directed to
pay Argentine bonds) and other agents (bondholders) located outside the US territory, too.
The arguments used by the District Court to justify its decision in this regard have been
fundamentally pragmatic: the injunction had to transcend the US borders so that the pres-
sure on Argentina was significant enough as to force payment to NML.81The Court of Appeals
embraced this argument and refused considering the reasons presented by foreign entities
(WEIDEMAIER; GELPERN, 2013, p. 34). Even though the US Law grants judges a large flex-
ibility to adapt the content of an injunction to the particular circumstances of a case, it does not
mean that by doing so they can undermine general principles of the US Law itself (a judge
could not, for example, order a subject to violate a law).
Judge Griesa noted that the injunction fell only on Argentina, which had voluntarily trans-
ferred its jurisdiction; the extension of this injunction to third parties was a possibility provid-
ed by Section 65 of the US FRCP. Nevertheless, although said section makes such extension
to third parties possible, it has no implication concerning extraterritoriality. Section 65 in no
way is an instrument aimed to extend a court jurisdiction beyond its territory or to transfer
the jurisdiction of the State which has transferred it to those agents which participate in it,
nor anything similar. In other words, and following the same logic of the preceding paragraph,
the judge, at the time of determining the content of an injunction, is subject to the general
principles that inform its Law. In this sense, it is a general basic principle in any legal system
that judges limit their orders to the territory over which they have jurisdiction; a principle
which, as was noted, has historically been respected by the US jurisprudence and, in partic-
ular, reaffirmed by the US Supreme Court in recent decisions.82
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NML: “Dussault v. Republic of Argentina”, Summary Order, October 5, 2015, US Court of Appeals for79
the Second Circuit, Nº 14-4235. 
See Mr. Justice David Richards’ Decision, February 13, 2015, above 20. 80
See Amend to the February 23th, 2012, Order, above 29.81
Weidemaier and Gelpern (2013) observe that U.S.A. courts can act extraterritoriality, but in an accurate82
form. This is not the case of the NML injunction, whose scope is enormous.  
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Extraterritoriality has tangentially been discussed in the NML litigation in relation to
the principle of sovereign immunity from execution (Section 1609 of FSIA). During the
judicial process, the Court of Appeals understood that the injunction issued by Judge
Griesa did not: (a) attack, retain or execute any property; (b) affect the free management
of any Argentine property, except incidentally, since the order prohibits transferring funds
to some bondholders and not to others; (c) transfer any domain or control of sovereign
property to the Court.83
Following the performed analysis, these arguments appear as limited and quite formal.
Although the injunction was directed to subjects, the action they were required to perform
relates to objects; in other words, subjects were only the means to prevent the Argentine
funds directed to pay the sovereign debt from reaching their recipients. In practice, the
injunction: (a) retained funds that Argentina, as owner of said funds, had decided to trans-
fer to its bondholders; (b) limited the free use of its assets not only incidentally, because
it affected the normal exercise of an essential function of a State as is the power to pay its
sovereign debt; (c) transferred the control of these assets to the Court, since the Court
was the authority that could order the payment system agents to act. The issue of extrater-
ritoriality makes sense in this context, given that Argentina transferred the property of its
funds entirely to Buenos Aires, and only about a third of the funds directed to pay Argen-
tine Exchange Bonds required passing through the US territory to reach their recipients.
In this sense, Cross considers that the NML injunction, since it affects property located out-
side of US territory, should be inadmissible by the principle of sovereign immunity from
execution; this injunction “defies the purpose of the FSIA, ignores the context in which the
statute was adopted, and contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the presumption
against extraterritoriality” (CROSS, 2015, p. 132).
The studied Citibank A. case goes a step further and helps to evaluate the extraterrito-
riality of the injunction from a foreign perspective to the US. Four conclusions can be drawn
from the performed analysis which a priori can be extended beyond the interpretation made
by the Argentine Court in this particular case.84
Firstly, a judge of a third country is competent to review, at the request of an interested
party, an injunction similar to the one of NML in relation to the effects that this injunction means
to produce in his/her territory. A judge’s competence or jurisdiction may be held: (a) because
the bonds in dispute were issued under the judge’s Law or (b) because the injunction orders
courses of action to agents who are subject to the Law the judges belong in since those agents
have been licensed to operate in the judges’ country.
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Decision of the US Court of Appeals, October 26, 2012, above 28, p. 25. 83
See EN-M Economía: sentencia, above 59.84
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Secondly and from a strictly legal perspective,85 an injunction of this sort could not auto-
matically produce effects on agents or assets located in foreign territories; that is to say, with-
out an interested agent initiating judicial proceedings in this regard, before a competent court
of such territory. In such proceedings, the court would have the opportunity to analyze,
among other things, whether the injunction was prescribed by a competent foreign judge or
whether it affects the public order in its country.
Thirdly, if in such procedure the court arrives at the conclusion that the foreign judge has
no jurisdiction to order courses of action to agents located in the territory of said court (a
conclusion which is certainly probable), an injunction could be declared invalid in the men-
tioned territory. The consequences would not be minor. This is so to the extent that it would
enable the subjects who consider themselves affected by the injunction to request the payment
system agents to meet their payment obligations in accordance with the agreement that gov-
erned their relationship; the authorities of the country in which these agents are licensed
could sanction them if they actually did not do so.
Finally, the transfer of jurisdiction by a State to the court of another State does not imply
an unlimited benefit in favor of the latter. Citizens or authorities of the transfer or State can
object the validity of a judgment of a foreign court; they can proceed not only before a supe-
rior instance of this court in its judicial system, but also before international courts when they
understand that the judgment violates International Law.86 They can proceed even before
judges of their own State when the judgment is intended to produce effects in their territory
and they believe it contravenes public order.87
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In practice, the NML injunction produced effects beyond the US territory. The reasons to explain this sit-85
uation, we understand, are extra-legal reasons, related mainly to the different power position that
Argentina and U.S. hold in global governance.
Argentina effectively sued U.S.A before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on August 7, 2014. 86
See EN-M Economía: sentencia, above 59.87
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